University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Arts - Papers (Archive)

Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities

February 2004

Dissent and heresy in medicine: models, methods, and strategies
Brian Martin
University of Wollongong, bmartin@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/artspapers
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Martin, Brian, Dissent and heresy in medicine: models, methods, and strategies 2004.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/artspapers/13

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Dissent and heresy in medicine: models, methods and strategies

Page 1 of 32

Dissent and heresy in
medicine: models,
methods and strategies
Published in Social Science and Medicine, vol. 58,
2004, pp. 713-725. (The published text differs in minor
ways from the version here.)

Brian Martin
Go to
Brian Martin's publications on dissent
Brian Martin's publications
Brian Martin's website

Abstract
Understanding the dynamics of dissent and heresy in
medicine can be aided by use of suitable frameworks. The
dynamics of the search for truth vary considerably
depending on whether the search is competitive or
cooperative and on whether truth is assumed to be unitary or
plural. Insights about dissent and heresy in medicine can be
gained by making comparisons to politics and religion. To
explain adherence to either orthodoxy or a challenging view,
partisans use a standard set of explanations; social scientists
use these plus others, especially symmetrical analyses.
There is a wide array of methods by which orthodoxy
maintains its domination and marginalises challengers.
Finally, challengers can adopt various strategies in order to
gain a hearing.

Keywords: Dissent; Heresy; Orthodoxy; Medical
knowledge; Medical research; Strategies
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Introduction
The conventional view is that the human immunodeficiency
virus, HIV, is responsible for AIDS. But for many years a
few scientists have espoused the incompatible view that
HIV is harmless and is not responsible for AIDS (Duesberg,
1996; Maggiore, 1999). The issue came to world attention in
2001 when South African President Thabo Mbeki invited a
number of so-called HIV/AIDS dissidents to join an
advisory panel. In response, more than 5000 scientists
signed a statement affirming support for the standard view
that HIV is the cause of AIDS. These events were unusual in
their visibility: few challenges to medical orthodoxy receive
such high-level media coverage. For example, the proposal
that squatting for defecation is a means for preventing
haemorrhoids has received little scientific attention, with
most discussion being in the pages of alternative health
magazines (Dimmer, Martin, Reeves & Sullivan, 1996).
Furthermore, there are challenges to orthodoxy that cannot
be found in the medical or any other literature, since their
proponents are not able to get published. When it comes to
orthodoxy and challenges to it, there is a tremendous
variation in ideas, support, visibility and outcome.
What is the best term for referring to a challenge to
orthodoxy? Wolpe (1994) offers an illuminating typology of
internal challenges. One type of challenge is to "knowledge
products" such as disease prognoses that question current
knowledge - namely, what are considered to be facts - while
operating within conventional assumptions about scientific
method. Wolpe calls this sort of challenge dissent and gives
the examples of Peter Duesberg and, at the collective level,
doctors practising homeopathy. A second type of challenge
is to the profession's authority structure, without challenging
knowledge systems or methods. Wolpe calls this rebellion
and gives examples of doctors using untested AIDS
therapies and women entering previously male-dominated
medical domains. The third type of challenge is to the
central values of the orthodoxy, including the very
assumptions about how claims should be evaluated. Wolpe
calls this heresy and gives the examples of Thomas Szasz's
claim that mental illness is a myth and, at a collective level,
the holistic health movement. Wolpe's useful classification
of challenges into dissent, rebellion and heresy will be
adopted here; the main focus will be on dissent and heresy.
Wolpe (1994) notes that these forms of challenge are not
always discrete. For example, some cases of dissent, such as
Benveniste's finding that extremely dilute solutions can have
biological activity (Davenas, Beauvais, Amara, Oberbaum,
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Robinzon, Miadonna, et al., 1988), can turn into heresy, in
this case by providing support to the heretical field of
homeopathy. Another important distinction made by Wolpe
(1994) is between heresy and reform, the later being a
challenge couched in orthodox terminology and treated
seriously by adherents of orthodoxy. Heresy is in effect
created by the response of orthodoxy: by attacking certain
views, those views become delineated as beyond the pale.
Heresy and dissent can be said, then, to be socially
constructed: their status as forms of ideological challenge is
not inherent in knowledge claims but depends on the way
they are treated by the orthodoxy.
It is a simplification to talk of any particular type of dissent
or heresy as if it constitutes a cohesive alternative. For
example, the views of Peter Duesberg, by far the most
prominent HIV/AIDS dissident, are often assumed to
represent the views of all HIV/AIDS dissidents, but actually
there is a considerable range of perspectives, not all
compatible, including the view that there is no solid
evidence that HIV even exists (Papadopulos-Eleopulos,
1988), causing infighting within the dissident movement
(http://www.virusmyth.net/aids/). Delving into any
particular case study can lead to increasing complexities that
seem to defy attempts at generalisation. Nevertheless, it can
be useful to seek to discover regular patterns and to develop
ways of explaining dissent and heresy. With the large
qualification that the full complexity of actual cases can
never be captured by any model, the task of this paper is to
outline some frameworks for understanding the dynamics of
dissent and heresy in medical theory and research
There are several ways to proceed. One fruitful approach is
to analyse case studies, which can reveal a wealth of insight.
Another is to start with principles of good research and
assumptions about the purpose of theory, looking for
guidance about practical implementation. Here a somewhat
different approach will be used. Various ways of explaining
adherence to orthodoxy and dissent/heresy will be described
from the characteristic viewpoints of partisans and social
scientists, and various methods for domination and
marginalisation will be outlined, which is basically an
exercise in describing the operation of power. Then a
number of strategies that challengers can adopt to gain a
hearing will be presented. Focussing on methods and
strategies is a pragmatic approach that does not seek to pass
judgement on claims and counterclaims.
But before examining methods and strategies, it is
worthwhile stepping back a bit and asking, "Why should
dissent and heresy exist?"
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Models of the search for truth
That dissent and heresy exist seems patently obvious, as
examination of any number of cases testifies, from cancer to
vaccination. Could it be otherwise?
A wider picture can be grasped by looking at two
assumptions: whether there is a single truth or a plurality of
truths and whether the search for truth occurs by conflict or
cooperation. This leads to four possibilities, as shown in
Figure 1.

Cooperation

Conflict

Unitary truth

IV.
Cooperative
search for truth
and social
benefit

I. Orthodoxy
versus
dissent/heresy

Plurality of
truths

III.
Cooperative
tolerance

II.
Competition;
market struggle

Figure 1. A classification of modes of search for truth in
terms of assumptions about cooperation/conflict and
unity/plurality of truth. The four quadrants are labelled I
through IV clockwise from upper right.

Quadrant I assumes conflict over truth, assumed to be
unitary. These conditions help account for the viciousness of
many struggles, which are win-lose: if there is only one
truth, then every other viewpoint must be wrong. Duesberg
argues that HIV is neither necessary nor sufficient to cause
AIDS, whereas the dominant view is that HIV is a necessary
factor. Both sides believe that only side can be correct namely, they assume a unitary truth about HIV's role - and,
in practice, conflict is the primary mode by which the issue
is engaged.
If it is assumed instead that there are multiple truths (a
standard postmodernist presumption), while retaining a
conflict orientation, then we enter Quadrant II, in which the
characteristic mode of interaction is competition, for
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example in a "market of modalities." This model seems to
fit some ailments such as back pain, in which different
patients consult doctors, chiropractors, osteopaths,
acupuncturists or others, without a general presumption that
any single modality provides a universal answer. This model
does not ideally fit any disease, since many practitioners
continue to believe they have a special insight into the truth,
but the increasing role of markets in health and medicine
means that modalities compete with each other in a market
in which claims to exclusive truth are less persuasive than in
the past, with consumers' demands for "choice" fostering a
tolerance for diverse truths (Gottlieb, 1997).
Moving to Quadrant III, we enter a region where
cooperation combines with an assumption of a plurality of
truths. In this hypothetical world, researchers and
practitioners would be happy to help each other develop
greater insights on a range of perspectives. Imagine, for
example, orthodox practitioners helping homeopaths to do
better homeopathy, and vice versa! This would be a
dramatic contrast to Quadrant I. This sort of cooperative
tolerance can happen on an individual level, such as when a
referee disagrees with an author's perspective but, rather
than attacking it, offers insights on improving the argument
within the author's framework. Cooperative tolerance may
occur in some patient support groups, in which the goal of
helping others takes precedence over epistemological
differences.
Finally, Quadrant IV describes the ideal world of scientific
research, in which researchers cooperate in a search for
truth. Although this is the model of research commonly
portrayed in science textbooks and uncritical histories, it is
far from what is usually found in the actual practice of
science, which is marked by rivalries and power plays
(Boffey, 1975; Dickson, 1984; Greenberg, 1967). Quadrant
IV is the model that seems to explain research when there
are no challengers. Within a paradigm, many researchers
cooperate to solve puzzles. On many issues in medicine
there is no disagreement, for example concerning whether it
is wise to stem massive loss of blood. Because cooperation
is much less dramatic than conflict, there is a tendency to
focus on conflict as the norm. Actually, conflict can only
thrive on a foundation of agreement about many other
matters.
The four quadrants in Figure 1 represent ideal types:
knowledge systems and interactions between them seldom
fit nicely within a single quadrant. A medical controversy
might begin mainly in one quadrant and proceed through
others, while exhibiting some elements of all four at any
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given time. For example, in the debate over the causes of
schizophrenia, competition between various biomedical
explanations could be said to fall within Quadrant IV
(though with some competitive elements), while alternative
models - the myth-of-mental-illness model and the mystical
model - are heresies with respect to the overall biomedical
orthodoxy, with the dynamics fitting squarely into Quadrant
I (Gosden, 2001). Another example is acupuncture, whose
challenge to biomedicine would normally sit in Quadrant I.
However, medical practitioners who use acupuncture and
redefine it in biomedical terms move the dynamics towards
Quadrants II or IV (Dew, 2000a).
Perspective on dissent and heresy in medicine can be gained
by making comparisons with politics and religion. First
consider politics. In the Quadrant I political perspective,
states claim a monopoly on political truth, treat opponents as
heretics and crush them by any means possible. Examples
are state repression and totalitarianism. In Quadrant II,
conflict is moderated by a recognition that truth is not
unitary, as when political parties compete electorally. (This
may occur within the context of a shared assumption about
certain political truths, such as that governments cannot
tolerate nonparty challenges, for example from workers.) An
example fitting with Quadrant III is the canton system,
which in principle allows local populations to adopt
different political systems within an overall framework of
cooperation, as found in Switzerland and was proposed, in
more radical form, for South Africa (Kendall & Louw,
1987). Finally, examples fitting Quadrant IV include
consensus (also called unitary democracy), such as in small
cooperatives, and - to use a very different case - so-called
"democratic centralism," in which a political party elite
agrees on a unified "line," as is typical of Leninist parties.
As in the case of medicine, the four "political quadrants" are
ideal types, with actual political systems exhibiting some
elements of all four types, with different weights at different
times.
What can be learned from this comparison between models
of medicine and politics? One point is that no particular
model (i.e., quadrant) is necessarily good or bad. In politics,
systems based on conflict and on cooperation - typified by
voting and consensus, respectively - each have strengths and
weaknesses as democratic forms (Mansbridge, 1980).
Quadrant I includes totalitarianism, with repression of all
dissent - including scientific dissent (Popovsky, 1980) - but
can also describe one face of a generally tolerant society,
namely when the government uses repression against those
labelled as traitors or terrorists. Nonetheless, the social costs
of operating in Quadrant I are considerable. In politics,
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repression of challengers, however justifiable, commonly
results in a reduction in civil liberties, so by analogy we
might expect that attacks on medical dissidents are likely to
inhibit open expression in medical research. Certainly there
is evidence that workers in many occupations are afraid to
challenge the status quo, for example in environmental
science (Wilson & Barnes, 1995) and government
employment (Zipparo, 1999).
Another important point is that there are alternatives to the
model of orthodoxy versus dissent/heresy. In the heat of
battle, the existence of alternatives is often forgotten.
Next consider religion or, perhaps more accurately, religious
establishments. The Quadrant I perspective on religion fits
what might be described as "intolerant monopolising
religions," namely those that consider they are holders of the
one and only truth and that those who do not agree are
heretics. Examples are Christianity and Islam during long
periods of their history. Proponents of other religions can
come under attack, but special enmity is reserved for
insiders who deviate from orthodoxy: these heretics are the
most feared and reviled (Kurtz, 1983, 1986).
In Quadrant II, religious hatreds are greatly reduced. Rather
than seeking to impose a monopoly on religious truth, there
is a competition for allegiance. This describes relations
between churches in many contemporary societies with
secular governments. It also applies to denominations within
some religions, such as different Protestant churches.
Quadrant III fits those liberal-minded or free-thinking
individuals who are found both within some religions and
outside of organised religion altogether, who seek spiritual
truths wherever they can find them, and encourage others to
find their own truths, using the resources of each religious
tradition to maximum effect. Cooperative tolerance also
describes some spiritual traditions such as Zen Buddhism.
Finally, in Quadrant IV might fit some aspects of
ecumenical movements that see different religions as all
speaking about the same thing, but in different languages, an
approach not greatly dissimilar to Quadrant III.
As before, the four religious quadrants are ideal types that
do not capture the messiness of reality. For example, leaders
of many churches may believe they have special access to
the truth but in practice engage in market-style competition
for allegiance because they do not have the power to impose
their views on others.
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These models of religion offer some insights concerning
medicine. The orthodoxy-heresy model of religion applies
most obviously when a religious establishment has a great
deal of political and social power that is linked to hegemony
in the realm of ideas. For example, during the Middle Ages
in Europe, the Catholic Church had enormous economic
resources of its own, strong ties to monarchs and a
monopoly over education, as well as crucial ideological
control. In most parts of the world today, no church has
anything like this degree of power, so there is greater
emphasis on market competition or a more cooperative
approach. However, in militant theocracies, such as Iran and
Afghanistan when crusading religious elites have controlled
the state, the orthodoxy-heresy model fits very well.
Another point is that whereas differences in beliefs can be
extremely threatening to an establishment, in a more
cooperative environment, these differences become
opportunities for learning. In other words, no belief is
heretical in itself. What makes it heresy is the attitude of the
dominant group. (This also applies to political beliefs.) In
short, it can be said that dissent and heresy are created by
attempts to create or maintain hegemony.
Finally, challenges from the inside - heresy and dissent - are
far more threatening to an establishment than outside
challenges. This is true of all establishments, not least
medicine (Dew, 1997; Wolpe, 1990).

Models for explaining
adherence to orthodoxy and
dissent/heresy
In the remainder of this paper, the focus will be on medicine
as described by Quadrant I, namely arenas in which
competition over an assumed unitary truth leads to the
dynamics of orthodoxy and dissent/heresy. Within this
model, a key question is how to explain adherence to either
medical orthodoxy or a challenging view. Partisans typically
explain their own views as being based on fact, logic and
sound scientific procedure, in short arguing that truth is on
their side. What is more interesting is how they explain
others' support for some different position. It is useful to
outline four explanations frequently articulated by partisans
in disputes.
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Table 1. Common explanations by partisans for others'
adherence to contrary beliefs
1. Wrong ideas
2. Personal prejudice; unscientific behaviour
3. Paradigm-boundedness
4. Vested interests

Explanation 1 is that the other side is wrong in terms of
facts, arguments and theories. For example, the medical
establishment claims that homeopathy is impossible since,
after sufficient dilutions, there is no physical mechanism by
which homeopathic medicines can cause any biological
effect. From the viewpoint of orthodox medicine, then,
homeopathy is rightly marginal, because it is based on
wrong ideas, and the orthodox view is dominant because it
is scientifically correct or at least founded on sound
scientific principles.
Advocates of homeopathy, on the other hand, believe that
medical orthodoxy is wrong. (Indeed, on investigating any
medical controversy, it is striking how fiercely each side
believes in its own validity and the other side's error.) But
this provides no way of explaining why the orthodoxy is
dominant, so homeopathists must seek some other
explanation for this.
Explanation 2 says that adherence to scientific beliefs is
based, in part, on scientists' personal prejudice. Although the
standard picture is that scientists deal with facts and logic
neutrally and unemotionally, in short objectively, there is
quite a lot of evidence that personal commitment, rivalry,
spite and other emotional drives affect scientific beliefs
(Mahoney, 1976; Mitroff, 1974; Watson, 1938). One need
only observe scientists in action to accept the role of
prejudice and "unscientific" behaviours. In a controversy,
this explanation is commonly applied by each side to the
other. Defenders of orthodoxy attribute dissent and heresy to
the psychological shortcomings of challengers: they have
grasped onto a bad idea and only stick with it because of
emotional commitments, rather than behaving scientifically.
Similarly, challengers explain adherence to orthodoxy by
the prejudice of establishment scientists.
Explanation 3 is based on the idea of a scientific paradigm,
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proposed by Kuhn (1970) and elaborated and modified by
others (Barnes, 1982; Fuller, 2000; Lakatos & Musgrave,
1970). A paradigm is a unified set of ideas and practices that
shapes scientific research in an area. This explanation does
not require any individual bias. The bias, in the form of
foundational assumptions, is built into the framework
underlying thinking and research in the area. Explanation 3
is commonly used by heretics to explain the resistance by
orthodox practitioners to any idea outside their standard
framework. Citing the well-known resistance to
Copernicanism, evolutionary biology and quantum physics,
heretics tie their own beliefs to a glorious tradition of
paradigm challenges. Within medicine, there are many
examples of challenges that later became orthodoxy (Stern,
1941), most famously Semmelweis's advocacy of sterile
conditions in maternity wards. Resistance to new ideas can
be interpreted as deriving from a commitment to a welldeveloped framework of ideas and an associated set of
practices. Using Wolpe's (1994) distinction, it can be said
that heretics challenge the reigning paradigm whereas
dissidents challenge only some elements within the
paradigm.
Defenders of orthodoxy are less likely to attribute heresy to
paradigm-boundedness, but when they do, it is on the basis
that the current paradigm is correct and that the challenging
paradigm is wrong. After all, paradigms have proved highly
successful in guiding research, and most challengers turn
out to be wrong. Western medical researchers might
acknowledge that acupuncture is based on a completely
different theory of body dynamics but simply reject the
alternative theory as baseless even if the procedure is
sometimes effective.
Explanation 4 attributes support for ideas to the role of
interests such as money, power and fame. For example, a
scientist may obtain, or hope to obtain, research funding
from aluminium companies to investigate Alzheimer's
disease, and hence have a preference for all theories aside
from the role of aluminium in the disease. A high-level
medical administrator and adviser may have a lot of power
as long as little criticism is made of the role of government
policy in focussing on medical treatment rather than
environmental prevention. An orthodox researcher's
substantial reputation might be jeopardised by openly
supporting a "fringe" position such as megavitamin therapy.
When an interest is well established such as through law,
economic power or custom, it is commonly called a vested
interest. A researcher can have an interest in getting a
particular paper published, but this interest is typically
fleeting and limited compared to the vested interest of a
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pharmaceutical company in drug sales and hence in
manipulating testing and influencing government
regulations (Abraham, 1995).
Given the massive role of government and corporate
funding in medical research, it is not hard to perceive the
role of political and economic interests. For example, it is
common for researchers to be paid by pharmaceutical
companies to test proprietary drugs. Sometimes researchers
stand to gain large amounts of money by supporting a
corporate line, most notoriously in the case of scientists who
testify on behalf of tobacco companies. For many research
scientists, though, fame is a more powerful lure. Nobel
prizes are seldom awarded to advocates of fringe therapies.
Challengers can become adept at explaining adherence to
orthodoxy by the role of vested interests. For example, it
might seem that dentists have little to gain from fluoridation,
since it is intended to reduce tooth decay in children.
Opponents of fluoridation, though, point to several profluoridation vested interests, including the careers of leading
pro-fluoridation researchers, the dental profession's
improved image by being associated with a scientifically
sophisticated intervention, the aluminium industry's
economic stake in having its fluoride waste seen as a
nutrient rather than a pollutant, and advantages to the sugary
food industry in diverting attention away from the role of
sugar in tooth decay (Martin, 1991). Proponents of
orthodoxy can also invoke vested interests in explaining
opposition. For example, supporters of fluoridation have
pointed to the role of right-wing political organisations,
religious groups and health-food businesses as having
something to gain from opposing fluoridation (though more
commonly proponents rely on explanations 1 and 2).
If partisans deploy explanations 1 to 4 to explain others'
positions, what about social scientists? Figure 2 divides up
"explanatory space" in two ways. First is whether the focus
is on knowledge, actors (namely the participants in the
dispute) or social structures (such as capitalism and
patriarchy). Second is whether the analysis treats the
contending knowledge claims, partisans and social
structures with the same conceptual tools.

Knowledge

Asymmetrical
analysis

Symmetrical
analysis

vi. Positivism

i. Sociology of
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knowledge
Actors

v. Social
dysfunction

ii. Group
politics
(procedural)

Social
structures

iv. Structural
analysis
(hegemonical)

iii. Structural
analysis
(constructivist)

Figure 2. Classification of some social science approaches
to studying orthodoxy and marginality.

The frameworks in Figure 2 are ideal types. Actual analyses
commonly combine elements of two or more of the
approaches, especially in looking at both epistemological
and political dimensions of a controversy, namely both
knowledge and actors/structures.
In the asymmetrical approaches, the assumption is that one
side is "right" scientifically and/or politically, so that the
main task of the social scientist is to explain deviation from
the correct view. The positivist approach (box vi) typically
involves the social scientist deciding what is scientifically
correct, often by determining the view of establishment
scientists. Adherence to this view, which is usually the
orthodoxy, is not considered to require sociological
explanation. The task then becomes to explain why some
people support contrary views. Psychological and social
factors can be used, such as ignorance, prejudice, fear,
confusion or any number of other variables, which can be
classified as forms of social dysfunction (box v). The
essence of the typical asymmetrical approach is that social
explanations are required only of those who deviate from
orthodoxy. To use a medical analogy, explanations are
sought for pathology but not good health. This can be
illustrated in Figure 3.

Good science

Bad science

Favourable
reception

IV. No
explanation
required

I. Bias,
paradigms,
vested interests

Unfavourable
reception

III. Bias,
paradigms,
vested interests

II. No
explanation
required
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Figure 3. Types of social explanations for orthodoxy and
marginality sought using an asymmetrical approach, as a
function of whether the science is considered good and
whether it is favourably received.

The asymmetrical approach involves seeking social
explanations for Quadrants I and III, where bad science is
favourably received or good science is unfavourably
received, but requires no explanation for Quadrants II and
IV.
Social structural approaches switch focus from actors,
characteristic of social dysfunction or group politics, to
social structures such as class, gender, ethnicity, the state,
bureaucracy and profession. A social structural approach to
chiropractic might focus, for example, on the role of the
state in creating a monopoly for conventional medicine.
Analyses that focus on the shaping of medical knowledge
and politics by capitalism often fit into the category of
asymmetrical social structural analyses (box iv), since only
the deformations of establishment knowledge are examined,
not those of knowledge linked to the working class; those
analyses that treat Marxism as "scientific" also draw on a
type of social science positivism. Pure structural analyses
are relatively rare, since to get at the nitty-gritty of
controversies it is necessary to examine actions as well as
structures.
The symmetrical approach, by contrast, seeks social
explanations for all beliefs, whether they are considered
correct or incorrect by scientists (Barnes, 1974; Bloor, 1976;
Fleck, 1979; Mulkay, 1979; Wallis, 1979). This is illustrated
in Figure 4, where more neutral terms are used instead of
"bias" and "vested interests."

Good science

Bad science

Favourable
reception

IV.
Psychology,
paradigms,
interests

I. Psychology,
paradigms,
interests

Unfavourable
reception

III.
Psychology,
paradigms,
interests

II. Psychology,
paradigms,
interests
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Figure 4. Types of social explanations for orthodoxy and
marginality sought using a symmetrical approach, as a
function of whether the science is considered good and
whether it is favourably received.

Unlike asymmetrical approaches, which are based on a
dichotomy between scientific and social explanations
(so that a social explanation is assumed to be
"unscientific"), a sociology-of-knowledge approach
(box i) does not pass judgement on scientific validity
and says that a social explanation can be compatible
with scientific validity. The sociology of medical
knowledge, unlike positivism, involves social
explanations for medical orthodoxy (Figlio, 1978;
Gubrium, 1987; Wright & Treacher, 1982).
The group politics approach (box ii) involves analysing
the actions of various groups in the controversy, such
as via public statements, meetings, fund-raising and
law-making. For example, a group politics approach to
chiropractic would look at actions by chiropractor
organisations, doctor associations, governments and
patient groups, for example in organising training,
credentials, research, licensing and medical insurance
coverage. A purely symmetrical group politics
approach uses the same conceptual tools to examine
groups on both sides of any conflict. Studies drawing
on resource mobilisation theory or political process
theory can be pursued symmetrically, though in
practice analysts often focus on actions by challenging
actors, thus fitting more into box v.
An example of constructivist analysis at the structural
level (box iii) might be an examination of the influence
of organisational cultures on knowledge production
both within conventional research institutes and
within groups that undertake research into challenging
paradigms. There appears to be little work that fits into
this category.
Although the sociology of knowledge places the analyst
in a position of being formally neutral with respect to
knowledge claims by participants, in practice it may be
impossible for social scientists to remain separate from
the controversies they study, at least in the case of
ongoing controversies. Some analysts are open or
covert partisans. Even when social scientists are
personally indifferent to the issues and claimants, their
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writings and comments can be used by partisans to
advance a particular side to the dispute (Scott,
Richards & Martin, 1990). Furthermore, the choice of a
framework of analysis and the choice of an issue to
study contribute to a "de facto partisanship" by the
analyst (Bammer & Martin, 1992). Thus, the issue of
symmetry versus asymmetry is far more complex than
it might appear on the surface.
The classification in Figure 2 assumes a snapshot of an
issue, but changes occur over time. Many studies of
scientific controversies have paid attention to
"closure," namely the ending of a dispute (Engelhardt
& Caplan, 1987). This has an epistemological
dimension, namely the reaching of scientific
agreement, as well as social and political dimensions.
Orthodoxy may be able to defeat a direct challenge; if
the losers continue their efforts by establishing a
separate research programme, this can be called
heterodox science, a description that might fit the
HIV/AIDS dissidents in recent years. This could also
be seen as a move from Quadrant I to Quadrant II in
Figure 1.
Given this highly abbreviated overview of explanations
for orthodoxy and dissent/heresy, it is possible to
compare the typical explanations by partisans and
social scientists. A fair generalisation is that virtually
all partisans are positivists: they explain their own
positions as being based on science and seek to provide
social explanations for their opponents' positions.
Partisans also draw on asymmetrical actor-oriented
and occasionally structural analyses to explain the
dynamics of dissent and heresy. Thus, the most
distinctive approaches used by social scientists but
almost never by partisans are the symmetrical ones,
which seek to explain all knowledge claims and
examine all social action using the same conceptual
tools. Note that a rudimentary sociology-of-knowledge
analysis can be artificially composed by combining the
positions of partisans from both sides of a dispute, for
example drawing on the attributions of interest made
by each side of the fluoridation controversy about the
other: such attributions are valuable guides for any
social scientist studying the role of interests in a
controversy.
Figure 2 presents six ideal-type social science
approaches to studying orthodoxy and marginality as if
the researcher can simply choose whichever one seems
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most fruitful or congenial. In practice, though, many
scholars are committed to particular approaches,
sometimes so much so that it is hard to recognise that
other approaches could be valid. Consider, for
example, Linus Pauling's claim that vitamin C in large
doses can cure cancer. A positivist would say that the
reason that megadoses of vitamin C has been rejected
as a cancer therapy is simply that the evidence has not
been anywhere strong enough. Richards (1991), who
adopts a symmetrical analysis, argues that Pauling's
work was marginalised through social and political
means, not by disinterested, rational processes; for
example, in the trials of vitamin C carried out by the
Mayo Clinic, Pauling's clinical and evaluative
framework was not used, thereby prejudicing the
result. The choice of a social science approach affects
not just the form of analysis but also the choice of what
to study. As indicated in Figure 3, those using an
asymmetrical approach are unlikely to feel the need to
explain either the ready acceptance of chemotherapy
(quadrant IV) or the rejection of vitamin C (quadrant
II). In contrast, Richards (1991) examines both the
wide acceptance and use of cytotoxic drug 5fluorouracil in treating cancer - despite it never having
been proven effective through double-blind trials - as
well as the rejection of vitamin C, using the same
analytical tools, as in Figure 4.

Methods of domination and
marginalisation
To focus on methods of domination and
marginalisation is to narrow the focus yet further,
away from epistemological issues to the role of
interests. In terms of partisans' explanations,
domination and marginalisation result from vested
interests and paradigms. In terms of social scientists'
explanations, domination and marginalisation result
from asymmetries in social structure or from
inequalities in the power of relevant groups, both of
which are compatible with a constructivist framework.
Table 2 lists some of the prime methods for
domination or hegemony, or in other words
maintaining an orthodoxy.
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Table 2. Some methods of domination in medical
research
• State power
• Training
• Restriction on entry
• Career opportunities
• Research resources
• Editorial control
• Incentives
• Belief system
• Peer pressure

These methods can be illustrated by the case of the
dominance of conventional treatments for cancer,
namely surgery, radiotherapy and chemotherapy,
supplemented by diagnostic testing (Hess, 1997, 2000;
Moss, 1996; Proctor, 1995).
The state exercises power over medical treatment in a
number of ways, including licensing of doctors (with
associated banning of certain procedures by
unlicensed practitioners), health insurance systems,
and legal restraints. For example, only licensed doctors
are allowed to carry out surgery; government health
insurance schemes cover conventional treatments but
not alternatives; and laws and regulations prevent
some substances being used for cancer treatment, such
as marijuana for pain relief.
Training to become a doctor is a process of
enculturation and indoctrination. The heavy work-load
of memorisation and intensive practical work
discourages independent thinking. Future doctors and
medical researchers are taught all about surgery,
radiotherapy and chemotherapy, assumed to be the
appropriate treatments, but seldom anything positive
about nonstandard approaches.
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Examinations provide a screening process that
encourages orthodoxy. For those who pursue a
research path through the PhD, the process of writing
a thesis or dissertation further weeds out those who
might challenge orthodoxy (Schmidt, 2000). Those
who spend their time investigating unorthodox ideas
about cancer will be less prepared to pass
examinations and likely to have a much greater
difficulty gaining their credential, especially if it is at a
mainstream institution.
Career opportunities include jobs, good salaries, high
status and some positions of power and influence in
advisory or decision-making bodies. These are
available to supporters of orthodoxy but almost never
to challengers. Some dissidents and even fewer
heretics may slip through the training and
credentialing system, but then there are few desirable
career paths.
Research resources include jobs with attached research
facilities, plus grant systems. In the cancer field, these
are overwhelmingly allocated to supporters of
orthodox approaches, with a margin of innovation
allowed.
Editorial power is involved in setting up journals,
accepting papers and running advertisements.
Mainstream medical journals deal largely with
conventional cancer therapies and publish ads linked
to these. Articles supporting alternative therapies
seldom can get past editors and referees at mainstream
journals and seldom are backed by companies able to
pay for major ads.
The category "incentives" covers a variety of
encouragements for adherence to orthodoxy, including
prizes as well as payments from companies, for
example to attend conferences, provide testimony or
recommend certain drugs.
"Belief system" refers to the domination of a set of
ideas, such as that a particular theory is scientifically
correct, ethically proper or socially appropriate. When
cancer researchers simply assume, in choosing
research projects, that the biomedical model and
conventional therapies are the best way to proceed, it
can be said that the conventional cancer belief system
is hegemonic.
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Finally, peer pressure is the influence of co-workers,
friends and respected figures in the profession. When
everyone else believes and acts according to a single
perspective, it can be extremely difficult to pursue a
contrary path. In the cancer field, accepting or at least
not criticising orthodox approaches is usually
necessary in order to maintain the respect of peers.
Other methods can be added to the list, depending on
the issue. In some cases, patient groups provide
support for orthodoxy, for example when cancer
support groups raise funds for radiotherapy units. On
some issues that have popular appeal, the mass media
contribute to domination, such as when they report
uncritical accounts of cancer "breakthroughs," always
in the mould of the biomedical model. The aim here is
not to provide an exhaustive list but to indicate some
of the more important methods.
The different methods of domination interact with
each other, most commonly by mutual reinforcement.
For example, when medical school teachers hold to the
conventional cancer belief system, they encourage
students to adopt the same beliefs; when journals
mainly publish articles in the orthodox tradition, this
aids the careers of the authors; and peer pressure
usually comes from widespread acceptance of a belief
system.
When all or virtually all the methods of domination
line up to support the same ideas, this can be called
"unified domination." This is largely the case for
orthodox cancer theory and therapy: for example, the
dissident idea that surgery has not been proved to be
effective for treatment of cancer (Benjamin, 1993) is
not supported by any of the methods of domination.
When some methods of domination support certain
ideas but others are not relevant, this can be called
"limited domination." This often applies to disputes
within specialities that do not threaten the wider
framework, such as over the conditions when surgery
for prostate cancer is advisable. When some methods
of domination support particular ideas but others
support contrary ideas, this can be called "divided
domination." For example, the idea that smoking
causes lung cancer (or, more recently, that passive
smoking causes lung cancer) is supported by most of
the methods in Table 2, but the tobacco industry
retains considerable financial resources, thus
providing incentives for a few scientists to argue the
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ever more discredited view that the smoking-cancer
connection is not proved.
To each of the methods of domination in Table 2 there
is a corresponding method of marginalisation, as listed
in Table 3.

Table 3. Some methods of active
marginalisation in medical research
• State attacks
• Deregistration
• Restriction on entry
• Career blockages
• Lack of resources
• Editorial rejection
• Disincentives
• Belief system
• Peer pressure

There is a considerable literature on suppression of
challenging views in medicine and science illustrating
these and other methods of marginalisation (Carter,
1993; Deyo, Psaty, Simon, Wagner & Omenn, 1997;
Fagin & Lavelle, 1996; Hess, 2000; Insight Team of
The Sunday Times, 1979; Martin, 1999; Moran, 1998;
Moss, 1996; Rosner & Markowitz, 1985; Walker, 1993).
In the cancer field, there have been government raids
on practitioners of alternative cancer therapies; some
such practitioners have had their medical licenses
revoked; students with dissident views have had
trouble gaining degrees; challengers have had
promotions denied and appointments blocked;
research funding has been denied or withdrawn;
research papers have been denied publication;
recognition and rewards have been unavailable;
standard belief systems have not had a space for
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contrary views; and peers have ostracised dissidents.
Linus Pauling was perhaps the most prominent of all
cancer dissidents, having considerable initial
advantages compared to most other challengers,
including a huge reputation (for example having won
two Nobel prizes), a full career behind him and hence
few career risks, and connections with the scientific
establishment. Nevertheless, he had to contend with
lack of funding, denial of publication and fierce attacks
on his credibility as a scientist (Richards, 1991).
Note that Table 3 refers to methods of active
marginalisation. This is when supporters of orthodoxy
take overt steps against challengers. Far more common
and difficult to deal with is what can be called passive
marginalisation, for which neglect is the primary
mechanism. A scientist may present an unorthodox
idea and not be overtly penalised, just greeted with
silence and lack of interest. An example is the
nutritional prevention of kidney stones by taking
magnesium and vitamin B6 (Gerras, Hanna, Feltman,
Bingham, Golant & Moyer, 1976). Arguably, if the
researchers who discovered this mode of prevention
had instead developed a proprietary drug or an
expensive apparatus for eliminating kidney stones
once they are formed, their ideas would have rapidly
become standard practice but, without support from
any powerful interests, their cheap and easy approach
has been largely ignored.
The most common initial response to challengers to
orthodoxy is passive marginalisation. If, nonetheless, a
challenger gains some degree of attention such as
through media coverage or patient interest, then active
measures may be used. Finally, if the challenge is too
strong to defeat by active measures, then cooption may
work to minimise the damage to orthodoxy (Willis,
1989). Arguably, the transformation of "alternative
therapies" into "complementary therapies," used as
minor supplements to conventional medical therapies,
serves to maintain medical hegemony in a situation
where many patients might otherwise opt entirely for
alternatives.

Strategies for dissidents and
heretics
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Faced with a hostile establishment and having limited
resources, what should a dissenting medical researcher
do? The analysis here implies that the prerequisite for
effective action is a shedding of the idealistic belief that
medicine operates purely on the basis of a communal
quest for truth and health. Those who develop new
ideas often imagine that all they need to do is to
present solid arguments and evidence in order for their
ideas to be taken seriously. Arguments and evidence
are crucially important, to be sure, but are seldom
adequate to make an establishment change. To have a
chance of success, challengers need to recognise the
central role of power and the way it is enmeshed with
knowledge and practices.
There are numerous ways for medical challengers to
proceed. For example, they can try to develop an
alternative ideology, publish in leading journals,
publish in popular magazines, enlist patrons, join
forces with other challengers, expose unsavoury
establishment behaviour and make links with social
movements (Hess, 2000; Martin, 1998; Wolpe, 1990,
1994). To categorise these varied responses, it is useful
to return to Figure 1 and to assign responses into one
of the four quadrants.
Challengers working within Quadrant I essentially aim
to defeat the prevailing orthodoxy and themselves
become bearers of the new orthodoxy, a strictly winlose process. The usual strategy is to play the same
game as the orthodoxy but play it much better in order
to overcome orthodoxy's inherent advantage. A typical
plan is to carry out excellent research and get it
published in top journals and to produce excellent
clinical results and win support from other
practitioners. It is advantageous to be seen to operate
within the same epistemological universe as the
orthodoxy, drawing on previously subsidiary themes
and winning adherents by being seen to solve
important problems while not being alien to the
dominant discourse. This strategy sounds
straightforward but can still be difficult to bring off. An
example is the theory that many gastric and duodenal
ulcers are caused by infection. The proponents of the
new theory required many years of publication and
clinical results before displacing the orthodox position
(Kidd & Modlin, 1998).
For challenges that are more sweeping or more
epistemologically divergent from the orthodoxy,
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strategies fitting into Quadrant II are more promising.
Rather than try to become a new orthodoxy, the aim
here is to compete for "market share" in a marketplace
of diverse knowledges and practices. Examples here
are alternative modalities to conventional treatment,
such as chiropractic, acupuncture, reflexology and
iridology. Instead of trying to compete on
epistemological grounds, namely tackling orthodoxy
on its own terms, it is useful to examine each of the
methods by which orthodoxy maintains its position
(Table 2) and to consider building alternatives. For
example, it may be possible to win over elements
within the state, such as members of a regulatory or
policy agency who are favourably inclined to
alternatives; to create alternative training institutes,
such as chiropractic colleges; to win over a few
independently-minded researchers or to raise money
to fund research; to set up journals dedicated to the
alternative; to elaborate a convincing belief system;
and to modify peer pressure by promoting an ideology
of tolerance for competition (rather than the
intolerance that creates heresy). Combining several of
these components into an overall programme is
essentially a process of building a competing
constituency (Dew, 2000b).
Quadrant II strategies often can greatly benefit by
"going public," namely taking claims directly to
nonscientific audiences, such as through media stories,
conferences and direct mail. Although this might be
seen as deviating from what is seen as a "scientific"
approach, actually orthodoxy uses the mass media and
other public forums regularly. Since the orthodoxy
normally has control over mainstream scientific
journals, going direct to the public is often the best way
to compete, and may even lay the groundwork for
more serious treatment in the scientific literature. This
point can be illustrated by the response to the theory
that AIDS originated from contaminated polio vaccines
used in Africa in the 1950s. In the 1980s, several
submissions about the theory were rejected by
scientific and medical journals. It was only after a
popular treatment in the rock magazine Rolling Stone
(Curtis, 1992) that leading journals discussed the
theory and a panel of scientists was set up to assess it
(Martin, 1993). However, little serious scientific
investigation of the theory was undertaken until after
publication of The river by writer Edward Hooper
(2000), a book that generated so much attention that
it could not be ignored by the AIDS establishment
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(Weiss & Wain-Hobson, 2001).
Another dimension to Quadrant II strategies is alliance
with or creation of a social change constituency. For
example, supporters of an approach to cancer based on
nutritional prevention could find common cause with
movements for organic farming, campaigns against
cancer-causing chemicals such as bovine growth
hormone or against polluting chemical plants, as well
as more general affinities with environmentalists and
public health campaigners. On the surface, to join a
social movement and push for social change may be
seen as "unscientific," but the orthodox medical
establishment is just as much involved in such
activities, such as via corporate funding for research
and public relations campaigns. The establishment is
also "political" in what it doesn't do, namely ignoring
and thus tolerating promotion of junk food, industries
producing dangerous by-products, hazardous work
practices, urban planning that reduces incentives and
opportunities for exercise, and many other unhealthy
aspects of everyday life, not to mention the massive
level of iatrogenic disease. Making ties with a social
movement is perhaps the most powerful means of
challenging orthodoxy through Quadrant II strategies.
Competition has a much better chance of success when
the challenger has not just an idea but also a practice,
such as a treatment or a type of therapy, since this
provides a direct outcome that can be used to
demonstrate effectiveness, for example to patients or
potential patrons. But when challenges are primarily in
the realm of ideas, it can be harder to compete.
Therefore it may be worth considering Quadrant III
strategies, based on cooperative tolerance. Perhaps the
best hope here is to find an open-minded scientist who
is willing to provide sympathetic comment and, if
appropriate, advocacy. For example, there are a few
successful senior scientists who no longer feel obliged
to compete for status and resources and thus have less
of a commitment to orthodoxy. One key supporter of
the theory that AIDS originated from contaminated
polio vaccines was the late W. D. Hamilton, a highly
prestigious biologist, who called for examination of the
theory. Although the debate over the origin of AIDS
has largely followed a conflict model, Hamilton can be
seen as a figure more in the mould of cooperative
tolerance. However, a strategy based entirely on
Quadrant III premises is unlikely to have much chance
of success, so strong is the conflict orientation in areas
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of scientific disagreement.
Finally there are strategies based on Quadrant IV,
which presume cooperative search for a single
scientific truth. It is here that many challengers devote
great but futile efforts: they believe that by presenting
their ideas honestly and openly to the scientific
community, the response will be fair-minded scrutiny
and, when warranted, acceptance. This happens so
seldom that it might be fair to say that the cooperative
search for scientific truth is a myth (Collins and Pinch,
1998; Feyerabend, 1975; Mitroff, 1974). But it is a
pervasive and powerful myth, which is why so many
naive challengers persist in seeking an open-minded
appraisal of their ideas. The usual outcome, especially
when the challengers are outsiders, is total lack of
interest, or occasionally active hostility, namely a
Quadrant I response.
Nevertheless, the myths associated with Quadrant IV
can be used to advantage by sophisticated challengers,
by exposing double standards and suppression.
Although rejection of dissent and heresy is the
standard mode of operation of science, the
establishment normally trades on a belief that ideas
are treated on their merits. In other words, a Quadrant
I reality is disguised by a Quadrant IV ideology. If
challengers can reveal the reality, for example by
showing that defenders of orthodoxy use double
standards, lie, unfairly block publications, harass
opponents, destroy documents, withdraw grants or
dismiss researchers, this can lend credibility to the
challengers and attract support for fairer treatment.
Many believers in orthodoxy believe in fair play; some
of them, after being made aware of suppression of
dissent, can be encouraged to genuinely cooperate in
truth-seeking according to the scientific ideal, though
of course this need not imply endorsement of any
dissenting view.

Conclusion
An orthodoxy that draws on the full range of resources,
namely which exercises unified domination, is
incredibly difficult to challenge. Many challengers
subscribe to the myth of scientific medicine as being
based on open-minded examination of evidence, and
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thus handicap themselves, since in practice they are
ignored or attacked. In order to have a chance, they
need to understand that science and medicine are
systems of knowledge intertwined with power, and
that if their alternative relies entirely on knowledge,
without a power base, it is destined for oblivion.
Success is least likely when orthodoxy is tackled headon, attempting to overturn it and become the new
orthodoxy. The biomedical model is not about to be
overthrown soon; at most some subsidiary features of
the model may be reformulated. Far more promising
are strategies based on competition, promoting belief
in a plurality of approaches. But even in a marketplace
of multiple alternatives, some approaches have great
advantages over others, especially due to links to
vested interests. Hence, for idealistic believers in a
search for truth and social benefit, the vision of a
cooperative striving for knowledge and human
betterment remains appealing. Ironically, though,
strategies based on this vision seem to have little
chance of success compared to more cynical strategies
based on cold calculation in a ruthless market.
What can be said about the role of social science in this
process? Much scholarly analysis is aimed primarily at
understanding, with the primary audience being other
scholars rather than participants in controversies.
Within this domain, there are divergences and
disagreements, expressed in different ways, between
positivism and constructivism and between actor- and
structure-oriented analyses. These and many related
theoretical issues are vitally important intellectually,
but how important are they for participants in
struggles over medical knowledge?
In assessing whether participants can actually use
scholarly analyses and insights, the differences
between positivism and constructivism or between
structural analysis and group politics may not be
nearly as important as they are for social scientists.
More vital is the actual topic addressed in the social
science research. Many studies remain entirely within
the bounds of orthodoxy, giving no inkling that
challenges even exist; others acknowledge the
existence of challenges but implicitly justify orthodoxy
by adopting standard assumptions about how medical
science operates.
Most useful to dissidents and heretics is serious
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attention. Their usual fate is to be made invisible and
to be written out of history. When social scientists
acknowledge the existence of a challenge - by reading
documents, by talking to and corresponding with
challengers, by recording their treatment - they can
give them encouragement, even when the social
scientists themselves are neutral or critical of the
challengers. Thus in addition to the content of social
science research, which can ignore, attack or support
challengers, the process of the research is a
contribution to the ongoing controversy. Even
historical investigations have relevance to ongoing
disputes, since to take dissent and heresy seriously in
previous eras is to open the door to questioning of
current orthodoxy. Thus, there is no way that social
science research into dissent and heresy can possibly
be neutral in any practical sense. The question is who
is being supported and how.
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